It wouldn't be enough to talk about Kant in one sitting, and as much as I would like to be fair to Kant, the space would only allow me to highlight some of the most important concepts in his Moral Philosophy.
For Kant, the morally important thing is not consequences of our actions but the way we (the agent) think when we make those choices. This is not to say that he has total disregard for consequences only that for him, what determines the morality of an act is/are the principle/s to which it was acted upon.
Kant started his whole philosophy of morals with the concept of a good will. The WILL, according to him is the (only) thing which can be inherently good. It is our power of rational moral choice, and is only present in human beings, which accorded human beings their inherent dignity and humanity the ultimate and unconditional value.
What makes the will good? The will is good when it acts out of duty, not out of inclination. To act out of duty is to act out of respect for the moral law, the moral law which is promulgated by human beings themselves based from their natural capacity to grasp and exercise rationality independent of our inclination or desire of any favorable or good consequences of a possible action.
How do we know the moral law? We use the "Categorical Imperative." The Categorical Imperative is stated as "act only on that maxim (or rules of actions) through which you can at the same time will that it becomes a universal law. Basically it requires the following steps:
1. Before you act, consider the maxim or principle on which you are acting.
2. Generalize that principle.
PERFORM TEST ONE.
If, once generalized, it no longer makes any sense because it contradicts itself, then it is wrong to use that maxim as a basis for action.
IF NECESSARY PERFORM TEST TWO (aka Reversibility)
If the generalized version makes sense, then ask whether you would choose to live in a world where it was followed by everyone. If not, do not act on that maxim.
One good example to illustrate Kant's moral theory is "making false promises."
Maxim: I may make a false promise in order to reap financial gain.
Generalized: Anyone may make a false promise to get something s/he wants.
This is self-contradictory because:
If anyone may make a "false promise," nobody would take a promise seriously; promising becomes meaningless.
Result: I may not act on that maxim.
Another way to articulate Kant's CI is "Always act so as to treat humanity (rational nature) whether in your own person of in the person of another (i.e., other human beings) never simply as a means to an end, but always as an end."
These are just some of the main tenets in Kant's moral theory. Having said these, let us examine the case of "Disclosure."
Scenario: X recently found out that he is HIV positive. Prior to knowing that he is positive, X has engaged in some 'unsafe' sexual practices, and could have possibly infected others. Is X on a duty to disclose to the previous sexual partners he could have possibly infected that he is HIV positive (and ask them to get tested?)
Again, duty is the "necessity" to act out of respect for the moral law. We are put into some concept of duty if and only if we are necessitated to act, out of our concept and respect for the moral law, as promulgated by reason and has satisfied the universality test.
Given the scenario above, we may start formulating our maxim-- I should tell all the previous partners I had of my HIV status so that they can get tested. Let me just emphasize 'should' to underscore the necessity (or the non-necessity) of the action.
Let us now examine the necessity of the action to determine whether we have a duty to do it or not, and eventually if this duty will pass the universality test. We may start with the basic duty of truth telling. We should always at all times tell the truth. That is one principle that can be accepted a universal law without contradiction. However, we may ask, "does not telling or non-disclosure constitute "lying"?"
Withholding some information does not necessarily violate the institution of truth telling. There will be no necessary contradictions with the maxim of truth telling since there will be no truths to be affirmed nor denied when we withhold. But we may still argue that although 'non-disclosure' does not constitute lying and has no contradiction with the principles of truth telling, it may be worthwhile to explore another principle, that is the duty "to save others".
The duty to save others may be properly expressed as "I will save others at all times." This may still be universally expressed as "Everyone will save everybody at all times, provided that he will not use his person or the person of anybody simply as means to an end but an end in itself'.
To illustrate the point, let us take for example the case of a drowning man. If someone is drowning, and I CAN swim, then I am put into a duty to save that man. To NOT save that person will be morally impermissible since we are treating the drowning person's life and humanity with less regard.
On the other hand, if someone is drowning, and I CANNOT swim, then, I am NOT put in any duty to save the drowning person since I will be using "my person" as a means to an end, and that is to save someone else's. This leads me to the point that "Ought" implies "Can". We are only put into some sort of Duty when we CAN.
Given the illustration, we can finally express the duty of "saving others" as "We will save others as much as we CAN, at all times."
Relating this to the previous point of disclosure, we may try and express the maxim as such "I will tell people truths that I know to save others as much as I can." Or to be more specific, "I will tell my previous sexual partners who I could have possibly infected as much as I CAN so that they can have themselves tested and stop the spread of infection".
Let us now examine that maxim.
First, are we violating any principles in the application of that maxim? It seems plausible to tell previous sexual partners about our serostatus. We can surely and easily tell our previous sexual partners that we have recently been diagnosed HIV positive, but we have to ask, is it necessary to do so? Moreso, are we using any person as a means to achieve our end, and that is to save our previous sexual partners, and their future sexual partner by having tested, and hopefully practice 'safer' sex in the future?
Although I CAN by principle tell my previous sexual partners about my serostatus, it is important to consider if I will be using my own person by doing that. I may put my own person and my own agency into jeopardy by disclosure. Although my intention by telling other previous sexual partners is to save them by making them know, so that they can also possibly save others they may have possibly infected, and so on ad infinitum, so as to stop the spread of the infection, I am putting myself and my agency into some danger, therefore making myself merely as a means to some end, and that is to stop the future infection.
It may be argued, however, that we may be ‘endangering’ others’ lives, thus making them mere means instead of an end in itself should we not disclose. We may put them into some serious health risk should we not tell them. Still, we are also putting others they will have unsafe sexual contacts into possible risk of infection.
I understand that it is important to stop future infection. At the same time, I understand that knowledge of one's serostatus is a good start to realizing that end. However, I also need to consider in this case the possibility of my agency being undermined should I go for that possibility. How can I be certain that by telling my previous sexual partners of my serostatus, I am guaranteeing that they will only act in such a way that they will only be engaging in safer sexual practices? I still remain hopeful, though.
So does this put me in a "duty to disclose?"
I will go back to my previous example of a drowning man. Although this may sound like an extreme example, it might be worth to try and see the parallelism. If we are all in the same boat, and we all do not know how to swim, it is no question that I do not have duty whatsoever to save others in the boat. To try and save others is not the prudent thing to do as I will be undermining my person, thus endangering my agency of the possibility to 'save others' in ways I can. Say if I die in my attempt to save another drowning person, I won’t be able to try and save an old lady crossing the street, or an impoverished kid who do not have something to eat. The point is, there are ways where 'saving others' can be fulfilled, and that is saving others in the way I can without possibly endangering my agency and my capacity to save others.
Applying the parallelism to the case of (non)disclosure, by disclosing my serostatus to previous sexual partners, I may be jeopardizing myself of the possible 'normal' life. Others may find out. To say the worst, I may suffer stigma and incarceration thereby making me unable to function 'normally', thus undermining my further duty of fighting (and possibly stopping) the spread of infection. That may sound an exaggeration, but remains a possibility.
Still following the parallelism, should I NOT disclose the information, I can still fulfill the ends of trying to fight the spread of infection (in the ways I CAN). I CAN definitely engage in safer sexual practices, which is one way. I can also go and start educating people about HIV/AIDS. And these acts, although directed towards the same end, that is to stop the spread of infection, does not necessarily endanger my person and my agency, thus, not violating the principle of Universality as discussed.
I recognize that everyone has the responsibility and is in a duty to fight the spread of HIV/AIDS. This is not questionable. This is something that can be accepted as a Universal law. It should be added however that "fighting in a way we CAN without endangering your person or the person of another" simply to achieve this end.
This responsibility and duty is also not retroactive. When I still didn’t know how to swim, I didn't have the duty to save anyone in a drowning boat. I cannot be faulted for not having been able to save anybody. But say I finally learn to swim, and the same drowning boat incident happen, I cannot escape my duty to save others. To NOT save anybody would be morally impermissible.
The same is the case of knowing my serostatus. I cannot be faulted for not being able to save those who I could have possibly infected "when I still didn't know." Disclosing my serostatus, although may not change the fact that I may or may have infected them, may possibly have them know their own status and could help a lot in stopping the spread of the virus. At the same time, I still cannot guarantee that by disclosure, I am completely not using my person as a means to achieving the end, that is to stop the spread of infection. It can, but the odds that I may be are still very apparent, though.
However, I am not sparing myself of the duty and my responsibility to stop the spread of the Virus. Now that I know my serostatus, to endanger other people by doing the same irresponsible act of unsafe sexual practices would be equally morally impermissible.
Finally, I can no longer save those who have drowned. But I CAN save (some of) those who will. And this is what I will do.
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